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Abstract
One of the most important promises of decentralization is to bring government closer to
the people through improved public services and decision making. In contrast to this
promise, the implementation of decentralization in Indonesia seems to create farther
distance between government and the people resulting in the paradox of distance. This
article argues that the paradox of distance in decentralized Indonesia is institutionally
engineered. It is due mainly to unclear mechanisms for the people to hold government
accountable and this stems from two main factors. The first one refers to the politics of
functional assignment between central and local governments which benefits central
government more than local government. The second factor is the macro institutional
arrangements on the relationships between local government and the people where there
is almost no way for local people to hold their government accountable or punish the
underperformed local government. This article recommends significant transformation
in the way the central government manages functional assignment to enable local gov-
ernments to be more responsive to local people as well as reform of key political arrange-
ments to make them more responsive and accountable to local people.
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Abstrak
Salah satu janji paling penting dari desentralisasi adalah untuk mendekatkan pemerintah
kepada masyarakat melalui peningkatan pelayanan publik dan pengambilan keputusan.
Ironisnya pelaksanaan desentralisasi di Indonesia tampaknya justru membuat jarak
antara pemerintah dan masyarakat semakin jauh. Artikel ini berpendapat bahwa
paradoks jarak tersebut terjadi akibat rekayasa kelembagaan. Setidaknya terdapat dua
hal yang menyebabkan kondisi tersebut, pertama terkait dengan politik pelimpahan
kewenangan dari pemerintah pusat kepada pemerintah daerah yang lebih
menguntungkan pemerintah pusat. Faktor kedua adalah pengaturan hubungan antara
pemerintah daerah dengan masyarakat di mana hampir tidak ada jalan bagi masyarakat
setempat untuk menuntut pertanggungjawaban pemerintah yang lalai menjalankan
tugasnya. Berkaca dari dua hal tersebut, artikel ini merekomendasikan perlunya
perubahan signifikan dalam cara pemerintah pusat mengelola kewenangan-kewenangan
fungsional sehingga lebih memungkinkan pemerintah daerah untuk lebih responsif dan
bertanggung jawab kepada masyarakatnya.
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Introduction
While decentralization in Indonesia has
been widely acknowledged, some concerns
sustain, especially concerning the effective-
ness of such policy to bring about real im-
pact for the welfare of the local people. This
is not to say that decentralization is without
fruits. On the contrary, it indeed has brought
about many significant effects for the people.
UNDP Country Director for Indonesia,
Elena Tischenko, once said that until 2009,
decentralization has produced more than
16,000 public facilities for local people with
annual expenditure increase of 20% on aver-
age since 2001 (Kabar Bisnis, 25 June 2009).
Decentralization has also helped democracy
flourishes at local level amidst public frus-
tration with the conduct of conflict-laden lo-
cal elections (Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009).
Similarly, local people are believed to have
more rooms to express their aspiration de-
spite limited structural opportunities to play
in daily formal politics. All these merits seem
to go hand in hand with the establishment
of many new autonomous regions
(pemekaran) which has increased very signifi-
cantly since 1999 (Carnegie 2008: 521;
USAID 2006).
Graph 1
The Increase of New Autonomous Regions,
1999-2009
Source: Bappenas (2010).
Amidst all these achievements, decen-
tralization still has a long way to go towards
its goals. Criticisms are widespread as to the
failure of decentralization to bring about its
promises. Both local and national media and
NGOs are very critical and skeptical on the
future of decentralization should there be no
significant leap to improve it (Media Indone-
sia, 28 April 2011; Kompas, 02 February 2011;
Kompas, 13 April 2010; Jawapos, 13 April
2010; Detiknews, 03 August 2010). Such criti-
cisms are not without reasons; indeed, they
are quite a genuine reflection of the post-de-
centralization conditions marked by poor
quality and access to basic public services
(especially health and education), decreasing
infrastructure quality, unfriendly business
climate, corruption, and still many others (see
for example Dwiyanto et.al 2007; Rinaldi,
Purnomo, and Damayanti 2007). In general,
there exists a growing distance between
people and government after decentraliza-
tion.
These two opposite yet co-existing phe-
nomena drive me to a long and never end-
ing debate in decentralization literature as
to why and how decentralization could bring
different results to different countries. This
article specifically tries to extend this classi-
cal debate on the extent to which decentrali-
zation succeeds (or fails) to abridge the dis-
tance between people and government. Re-
flecting on what have happened so far to
decentralization in Indonesia, this article ar-
gues that after decentralization, the distance
between people and government has become
even wider. This stands in contrast to the most
important promise of decentralization to re-
duce alienation by bringing people closer to
the government and vice versa (for example
Schroeder 2003; Smith 1986; Yin and Lucas
1974; Oates 1972). This is a contemporary
version of the paradox of distance, in which,
decentralization not only fails to bridge the
distance between people and the government
but also makes such distance even farther.
To some extent, local people trust central
government more than their local govern-
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ment and feel better-off under New Order
centralized regime. This paradox deserves
special academic attention, at least to me.
Decentralization and Distance
In governance literature, decentraliza-
tion has become one of the most debated is-
sues. This is simply due to two main reasons:
(1) decentralization is defined in different
ways for different motivations, and (2) de-
centralization has brought about different
outcomes for different countries.
The literature on why a country imple-
ments decentralization is abundant and it is
easy to notice different motivations in each
country. For Eastern European and Former
Soviet Union countries, decentralization is
part of political transformation from central-
ized governance toward more participatory
decision-making process. For other countries
such as Sri Lanka, Thailand, and South Af-
rica, decentralization a part of the strategies
to deal with ethnic and separatist conflict.
Still for countries like Uganda and Chile,
decentralization is implemented to improve
public services (Eaton, Kaiser and Smoke
2010: 8-9; Muriisa 2008:85). As for Indone-
sia, while decentralization is legally stipulated
to increase people’s welfare, the underpin-
ning reason is mainly to strengthen national
integration (Mietzner 2011:1).
Departing from different motivations, it
is actually unsurprising to witness how de-
centralization brings about different politi-
cal outcomes. However, it is still surprising
to see the gap between the promises of de-
centralization and the real outcomes it brings
in a specific country. This applies to almost
all countries implementing decentralization
despite its different degree. For example, the
potential for break-up in diversified countries
is still high even when decentralization is
implemented to tackle it. Similarly, the qual-
ity of and access to public services are still
problematic under decentralization amidst
its campaign to improve them.
In line with this debate, there are grow-
ing literatures on how and why decentrali-
zation creates – or closes – the distance be-
tween government and citizens. One of the
claims of decentralization is that decentrali-
zation closes the distance between govern-
ment and citizens. Such distance is more psy-
chological than physical. This is something
to do with the (mis)match between govern-
ment activities and citizen preference. As
Huther and Shah put it: Governance qual-
ity is enhanced, according to this theory, by
more closely matching services with citizen
preferences, and by moving governments
closer to the people they are intended to serve,
which ensures greater accountability of the
public sector (Huther and Shah 2004:1).
The distance between government and
citizens can also be understood in terms of
alienation. Decentralization is believed to
address the problem of political alienation
created under highly centralized govern-
ment (Muriisa 2008: 85). Yin and Lucas
(1973:328) maintains that:
... decentralization reduces organizational
scale and makes government more
responsive to neighborhood needs; the
citizen is more active in relation to
neighborhood institutions, receives better
services, and somehow becomes less
alienated.
The argument implies that though the
fruits of decentralization are perceived in dif-
ferent ways, they generally refer to the ful-
fillment of citizen needs. Consequently, the
most valid test as to whether decentraliza-
tion succeeds or fails must be measured by
the extent to which it has met citizen needs.
Decentralization is more a peril than a merit
once it brings more problems than solutions
to citizen needs. It is in this context that dis-
tance increases or decreases.
Once the fruits of decentralization are
revealed, the next job is to examine the un-
derpinning causes behind them. The current
literature provides abundant answers to this
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old question. As for Indonesia, the most com-
mon argument for the ill of decentralization
to close the distance between government
and citizens lies in the lack of capacity. De-
centralization is implemented without
proper preparation to develop the capacity
of local government – financial and human
resources – to undertake the newly assigned
responsibilities (Simatupang 2009; Werlin
2008). Other scholars refer more to the
prevalence of corruption (Rinaldi, Purnomo,
and Damayanti 2007; Davidsen and
Timberman 2006). This is in line with the so-
called Neo-Marxist argument which links all
problems to the effect of entrenched oligar-
chic interests. Political actors and their inter-
ests are almost always considered the main
culprit for all the wrongdoings in decentrali-
zation (see for example Carneqie 2008/2009;
Hadiz and Robinson, 2004).
While this body of literature is impor-
tant, it is insufficient. This article argues in-
stead that while actors and interest are im-
portant, they must be understood in the con-
text where they operate. Different context
requires and structures different behavior
among actors which consequently produces
different political outcomes. One such con-
text is political institutions. Drawing insight
from neo-institutionalism literature, I would
argue and show that the paradox of distance
in decentralized Indonesia is institutionally
engineered. Therefore, it is extremely impor-
tant to investigate institutional arrangements
on decentralization and how actors use or
misuse them for their own interests. Such
perspective is still underplayed in existing lit-
erature on Indonesia (King 2003; see also
MacIntyre 2003).
To pursue this argument, this article will
focus on two most important institutional
pillars for decentralization. The first one is
functional assignment between national, pro-
vincial and local government – hereafter re-
ferred to as functional assignment – and the
second one is institutional arrangements on
local election. This is not to say that other
institutions are not important. Rather, it is
simply because of their nature which is
highly political compared to other adminis-
trative arrangements which are more tech-
nical. By taking this choice, this article ex-
pects to drive more attention to studies on
the effect of political institutions. Such per-
spective will also enable further institutional
reform to make decentralization arrange-
ments more supportive tools for the accom-
plishment of its promises.
The Politics of Functional Assignment
While functional assignment is very
common to those countries applying federal
system, it is not uncommon for unitary states
like Indonesia. However, the nature of func-
tional assignment in both systems is quite
different. In federal countries, functional as-
signment is more or less bottom-up, in which,
countries committed to form a federation
agree to delegate some of its authorities to
the federal government. The federal govern-
ment normally maintains only limited au-
thorities such as foreign policy, defense, and
central bank. On the contrary, functional
assignment in unitary countries generally
takes a relatively top-down fashion in which
the national government still controls and
dictates which authorities are to be trans-
ferred to the local government and which
authorities stay at the national government.
Looking at the case of Indonesia, some
prominent features are worth-noting. Since
1999, Indonesia has been experimenting with
finding appropriate formula for decentraliz-
ing national authorities or assignments to the
region. Through Law 22/1999, decentraliza-
tion was used to refer to the transfer of au-
thorities from the national government to
autonomous local government in the context
of Unitary State of Indonesia. Departing
from this concept, functional assignment was
developed very loosely. The law applies gen-
eral competence or open-ended functional
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assignment model which stipulates only
broad principles. The local government, in
this stance, is given all necessary discretions
to manage its own business as long as it does
not compromise higher laws. The national
government only reserves itself with authori-
ties in areas of foreign policy, defense and se-
curity, judicial affairs, monetary and fiscal af-
fairs, religious affairs, and others. What the
law means by others are authorities regard-
ing policies in areas of national development
planning and supervision, fiscal balancing
funds, administrative system and economic
institutions, human resource development,
natural resources and highly strategic tech-
nology use, environmental conservation, and
national standardization. Beyond these are the
authorities of local government. While such
arrangement aims at providing local govern-
ments with more rooms for maneuver to re-
spond to local concerns, it potentially creates
uncertainty as local governments tend to
avoid resource-consuming assignments. Be-
sides, local governments are also too small a
unit to handle so many assignments.
Realizing that the application of general
competence model of functional assignment
has those potential problems, Indonesia then
changes the model by revising Law 22/1999
with Law 32/2004. The latter makes functional
assignment much clearer through Govern-
ment Regulation No. 38/2007. It clarifies the
principles used in assigning government func-
tions based on three pillars: externality, ac-
countability, and efficiency. Based on such
principles, the national government reserves
for itself certain authorities in foreign policy,
defense and security, justice, monetary and
fiscal policies, and religious affairs. However,
the national government also secures itself with
additional structural rooms to play in concur-
rent assignments which cover 31 affairs. These
are assignments to be administered concur-
rently by national, provincial and local gov-
ernments. Out of these figures, the law then
assigns the local governments to administer
26 mandatory affairs. As can be seen in Table
1, the list excludes the last 5 government as-
signments along with agriculture, transmi-
gration and tourism. There is no clear expla-
nation as to how and why this is so and this
is another point of confusion in the institu-
tional arrangement on functional assignment
in Indonesia.
As to make the picture more compli-
cated, the law also assigns 8 optional assign-
ments to the local government. These are gov-
ernment functions which really exist and
have the potential to improve people’s wel-
fare along with the condition, uniqueness,
and competitive advantages of respective
regions. This arrangement raises further con-
fusion, at least to me. Given the nature of
Indonesia as agricultural and maritime coun-
try, why does the central government catego-
rize agriculture and maritime and fishery
affairs as optional and not as mandatory as-
signments? The same question applies to for-
estry and energy and mineral resources as-
signments. What is really the basis for such
division? Using the criteria the government
introduces – efficiency, accountability and
externality – fails to address such question
satisfactorily.
Table 1
Functional Assignments According to
Government Regulation No. 38/2007
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Source: Government Regulation No.38/2007
Policy confusion does not stop at this
point. The law provides more rooms for un-
certainty as it also allows local government
the power to administer other residual assign-
ment. These are the assignments not yet in-
cluded in the list which the local government
might feel it necessary to administer. In such
case, the local government could simply pro-
pose it to the central government for ap-
proval prior to its implementation. While this
is to provide local government with structural
opportunity to respond to specific condition
in its own territory, it opens multi interpreta-
tions.
Overall, it seems that Law 32/2004 tries
to be more specific. It applies Ultra Vires
model of functional assignment. While such
model guarantees more clarity, it is not with-
out problem. The most common problem in
such arrangement is the opportunity for du-
plication and conflict among levels of gov-
ernment as to who is responsible for what
assignment. Strategic and income-generat-
ing assignments become fertile arena for such
conflict while resource-consuming affairs
tend to be neglected by either levels of gov-
ernment.
More important than discussing such
arrangement is the implication it raises for
decentralization ideals. First of all, though
such a sudden transfer of so many assign-
ments seems in line with decentralization
ideals, it potentially endangers the prospect
of decentralization itself. While efficiency,
accountability and externality are important
pillars for assigning government functions,
it after all ignores the most important pre-
condition for the success of decentralization,
namely, capacity (Lele 2009; Ferrazzi 2008).
Under previous New Order regime with a
very centralized type of government, many
local governments were trapped in a learned
disability syndrome. They had no sufficient
capacity to manage their own business since
it was up to the national government to de-
cide. Now, all of sudden, they get so many
assignments to be administered autono-
mously. Amidst the absence of sufficient ca-
pacity, what the local governments can – and
sometimes must – do is to comply with the
rules of game set by the national government.
As to contradict the ideals of decentraliza-
tion, local governments very frequently take
the position of waiting for the directions from
the national government to an extent that
they lose their autonomy. Under such cir-
cumstances, rather than fighting for the in-
terests of local community and bringing
them to the national government, local gov-
ernments simply act as an agent that brings
national government’s interest to the local
community. At the same time, the national
government uses this to justify its prolong-
ing intervention by issuing numbers of rules
and regulations which make local govern-
ment even more incapacitated.
The most notorious anecdotal evidence
for such an indication is the way local gov-
ernments manage their organizations.
Through Government Regulation No. 8/2003
then revised by Government Regulation No.
41/2007, the national government has made
it clear that local government must comply
with certain formula when establishing their
organizational structure. This is simply an
initiative to stop local government from es-
tablishing a very fat organization with so
many unnecessary government bodies and
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structural positions. This seems to have
worked as planned. However, when observ-
ing the names of local government bodies,
there are commonalities in almost all local
governments despite different and unique
local characteristics they have. The simplest
interpretation to this phenomenon is that it
is because the local government must admin-
ister the already determined mandatory as-
signments applicable to all regions. Such in-
terpretation is only partly true. A closer look
reveals that it is highly political and this is a
cunning strategy.
While most authorities are already
transferred to local government, the central
government still maintains its control over
budget until the very recent time. A major
proportion of local government budget
comes from national transfer. Only limited
numbers of local government which could
enjoy some degree of financial independence,
thanks to natural resources they have. The
majority of local governments depend to a
large extent to the national financial transfer
to run its business. A rough calculation comes
with a figure of almost 90 percent for such
dependency with a very limited figure of lo-
cal own-revenue (PAD) (see Graph 2). Min-
ister of Home Affairs, Gamawan Fauzi, once
said that local own-revenue only contributes
17 percent on average to total local budget
and the national transfer to local government
has increased by 300 percent since 2005 (Me-
dia Indonesia, 28 April 2011). With such fig-
ure of financial dependency, it is the interest
of local government to maintain its relation-
ships with the line ministries other than the
Ministry of Home Affairs (MOHA) which still
control huge amount of money. For example,
in 2010 budget, the national government
spent 39.38 percent of national budget for
itself. Beyond that, it still had the allocation
of 11.22 percent of spending at local level,
3.14 percent for direct community assistance,
and 15.66 percent of subsidies. In total, it
controlled no less than 69.4 percent of na-
tional budget. It left only 30.60 percent of the
total budget as direct transfer to local gov-
ernment (table 2). This confirms that the na-
tional government still maintains control over
major proportion of national budget amidst
huge transfer of assignments to the local gov-
ernment (Granado, Martinez-Vasquez and
Simatupang 2008; Schroeder 2003:398). It
can be seen that the introduction of
concurrency principle as one of the working
pillars for functional assignment has pro-
vided a very wide room for the national gov-
ernment to maneuver against local govern-
ments. For local government, the easiest way
to maintain access to these resources is by
using the same structures and terms for its
government bodies. The way the national
government manages its business only wors-
ens such dependency. When it plans to do
something in the region, the first step to take
is to identify local government bodies with
the same mandate and name to be their part-
ner. In that way, the national government
could maintain its control over local govern-
ment while the local government could still
get access to additional fund from the line
ministries.
Graph 2
Comparison between Total Own-Revenue and
Total Budget at Provincial and District Level
(2005-2010)
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Table 2
National and Local Spending Distribution,
2010
Source: Ministry of Finance (2011)
While this relationship seems to be mu-
tually beneficial, it actually comes at the ex-
pense of local community. By complying
more to line ministries, local government
bodies are more responsive to the interest of
the national government rather than to their
own people. This explains why public frus-
tration sustains amidst increasing financial
transfer to local government from year to
year.
Such blind compliance is worsened by
the way local government manage its bud-
get. Despite increasing amount of national
transfer to the region, there is no significant
change yet as to the way local government
disburse the money. Graph 3 shows that the
majority of local budget is allocated for rou-
tine posts such as salary and operational cost
and only very limited amount is allocated for
investment for public purposes. This applies
at both provincial and local level. A rough
estimation indicates that local government
spends up to 75 percent of total budget for
salary and other operational costs and only
around 25 percent is spent for public services
posts at the most. This is an alarming phe-
nomenon which produces a self-serving gov-
ernment and therefore could implicate the
very dream of decentralization. After all, it is
hardly any logical relationships between fi-
nancial transfer to the region and the capac-
ity of local government to meet local needs.
Graph 3
Trend in Local Spending (Billion Rupiah)
This information implies that local gov-
ernments are more accountable and respon-
sive to the central government. As central
government still controls most of financial
resources, local governments have no other
way but to be answerable to it. While this
sounds reasonable, however, this must not
come at the expense of direct accountability
to the people. It is broadly acknowledged
that public accountability of local govern-
ment to its people will be much higher if lo-
cal government is not predominantly re-
quired to be responsible to the central gov-
ernment (Venning 2009:112).
This diagnosis raises the concern that
there are more to do in area of functional
assignment. This concern is mostly political
and this stems from the very context of
Indonesia’s decentralization. The utmost
motive of decentralization in Indonesia is
more a political move to maintain national
integration than an initiative to improve pub-
lic services for the people. It is clearly stipu-
lated through the constitution and organic
laws that decentralization must be put into
context of unitary state of Indonesia. This is
why decentralization is placed more at dis-
trict and not at provincial level. Understand-
ably, national government still controls most
of authorities even when the majority of such
authorities have been transferred to the re-
gion. Amidst limited capacity, this forces the
local government to be more loyal and re-
sponsive to the national government than to
its own people.
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Local Direct Election
The next area of concern is the dynam-
ics of relationships between the local govern-
ment and the people. It is broadly argued
that decentralization is one of the democratic
mechanisms to bring people closer to its gov-
ernment. It is a democratic tool to enable the
people to get their voices heard. Such a pos-
tulate must be taken thoroughly as the ex-
tent to which local people can channel their
voices to the government depends to a large
extent on the presence (or absence) of demo-
cratic mechanisms to hold the government
accountable such as elections, hearings,
citizen’s report card, citizen’s charter, formal
complaint mechanisms, polls and opinion
surveys, and other democratic mechanisms
(Venning 2009: 111; Word Resources
2004:93). In other words, for local voices to
reach government’s decision-making ma-
chines, there must be voice and exit mecha-
nisms at work.
Looking at the case of Indonesia, this is
really a big challenge. The only available
mechanism for the people to hold their gov-
ernment accountable is local election. Indo-
nesia has engineered it quite well since at least
2004 by the introduction of direct election for
mayors and governors. This is argued to
strengthen “the political incentives of local
government to provide the policies and ser-
vices desired by their constituents” (Eckardt
and Shah 2006:239). While this is really im-
portant but it is clearly insufficient. Even this
institution is not without flaw and the main
reason for that is the absence of clear point
of accountability. This is applicable not only
for local election but also for national elec-
tion. A closer look brings me to the arrange-
ment of local election itself as the main cul-
prit for the absence of accountability. Why
this is so?
At both theoretical and practical level,
Indonesia’s local election regime does not al-
low local politicians to account to the people.
This is because of the presence of so many
parties with different ideologies – if any –
which not only compete for parliamentary
seats but also those get elected. In the 2004
election, there existed 24 parties competing
in election while in the 2009 election, the
numbers increased to 38 parties. These are
also the parties eligible to compete at local
parliamentary election as well as the election
of head of local government (Pilkada). With
such an arrangement, it has become a rule
than an exception that, first, local parlia-
ments are so fragmented consisting of sev-
eral parties having seats that effective and
efficient policy-making process is simply a
distant memory. Local executive almost al-
ways finds it difficult to push its legislative
agenda, even when delay is very costly. It has
to bargain with the fragmented, yet less ex-
perienced, parliament. This sometimes
pushes the executive to buy legislative votes
which makes bribery and corruption very
common in decentralized Indonesia (Lele
2011).
The second implication is the unavoid-
ability of coalition. The law secures strong
legislative powers for local parliament. To be
able to govern effectively, therefore, local
head of government must secure sufficient
parliamentary votes. This forces his or her to
build parliamentary coalition though par-
liamentary coalition brings more problems
than solution. Parties which join the coalition
are also parties which frequently hijack the
executive in taking any necessary and im-
mediate actions. This is due to the nature of
coalition in contemporary Indonesia which
is temporary and unreliable. It is used as
political mechanism to get direct access to
public resources controlled by the executive.
The immediate consequence of the cur-
rent institutional arrangements is that there
is hardly any room left to allow the public
hold their government accountable. This is
against the push for local direct election to
enable the citizens control their government
(Erb and Sulistiyanto 2009). As there are so
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many forces in both legislative and execu-
tive bodies, the local people have no chance
to blame or punish their leaders should some-
thing wrong occur. Even the conduct of elec-
tion every five years fails to serve as an effec-
tive mechanism to punish the under-
performed local government and to give
credit to the well-performed government. The
re-election of several heads of local govern-
ment with majority votes is still very rare
though the number has grown promisingly.
With the absence of clear election
mechanism to hold local government really
accountable to its people, the only choice left
turns to alternative mechanisms other than
election. The question then becomes: are
there any hearing mechanisms in place?
Have local governments had citizen’s report
card or citizen charter to enable local people
maintain control over them? Are there any
effective voice mechanisms? Positive answers
to all these questions are expected to have
positive effect on the relationships among
local government and their people. Unfor-
tunately, most of the answers to these ques-
tions raise more pessimism than optimism.
Again, even in these more administrative
mechanisms, only a very limited number of
local governments has had them. For ex-
ample, local participatory planning mecha-
nism (musrenbang) has been widely criti-
cized. Similarly, initiatives to implement
citizen’s charter and citizen’s report card find
opposition from local patrimonial elites.
Conclusion and Implication
What I am trying to say in the previous
sections is that, decentralization has by de-
sign failed to bring local people closer to their
government. It this way, the paradox of dis-
tance in decentralized Indonesia is institu-
tionally engineered. Therefore, any initiatives
to bring people closer to their government
must first of all start with thorough institu-
tional engineering, especially regarding func-
tional arrangement and local election.
First, as regards functional assignment,
the transfer of power to the local government
must come along with the transfer of capac-
ity, both administrative and financial capac-
ity. There is hardly public accountability
without sufficient capacity. While adminis-
trative capacity requires long term and en-
during capacity building initiatives, financial
capacity can and must be immediately
reengineered. The only constraint for such
initiative is the political willingness of the cen-
tral government to loosen its control over lo-
cal government. The scheme for fiscal bal-
ance and national transfer in general must
be adjusted to more reflect the dynamics at
local level. The national government will only
need to install effective monitoring and
evaluation mechanisms to ensure that bud-
get is disbursed in a responsible and account-
able manner and in line with local needs. Too
much control from the national government
will only delay if not worsen the problems.
All the national government needs to do is to
arm the local government with sufficient ca-
pacity to run local government. As local gov-
ernment has long been controlled by a cen-
tralized government, it must be allowed cer-
tain margin of error so that it can learn to do
things right, even by making tolerable mis-
takes.
Second, as for local-government-people
relationships, further institutional engineer-
ing is required to hold local elites more ac-
countable to their constituents. Local election
still contains many flaws to serve as an effec-
tive mechanism for such purpose. It leaves
us with two choices. The first one is reform
election. Among the agenda is the simplifi-
cation of party system and simply reducing
the number of parties. There is huge debate
on tightening party entry into parliament by
applying a much tighter parliamentary
threshold – Golkar for example proposed 5
percent in the coming election law. There are
also voices for an independent candidate for
head of local government, a proposal which
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I personally disagree as it could isolate the
head of local government and make it a lame
duck of political opposition. All require strong
political consensus which is so far hard to
build. Therefore, the next alternative needs
to be developed and this relates to account-
ability mechanisms other than election. Some
local governments have implemented
citizen’s charter in public service delivery and
this needs sustained energy. This proves ef-
fective in enhancing the quality of services
and a sense of service among government
officers to the people. Others have also imple-
mented local version of public hearings or
deliberation such as Jaring Asmara (aspira-
tion aggregation), participatory planning,
budget watch, and other similar initiatives.
Such mechanisms come partly from within
the local government and partly from the
demand of public pressure groups. This re-
quires new way of running the government
and has closed the gap between local people
and their government. While such innova-
tion is broadly acknowledged, there needs
to be more consolidated mechanism to make
it more commonly institutionalized as demo-
cratic ways of running government business.
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